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/ BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
/ Appeal No. 20100395-CA 
JURISDICTION 
This Appeal was taken by right to the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to Rules 3 and 4 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, which poured-over the case to the Utah Court of Appeals. This 
Court has jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to 78A-4-103(j) Utah Code Annotated. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the Court abuse its discretion by striking the Defendant's Answer and entering a 
default judgment as a sanction for Defendant's failure to appear and defend at time of trial? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Sanctions are reviewed for abuse of discretion. 
2. Did the Court abuse its discretion by failing to dismiss the proceeding below for lack of 
jurisdiction? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Reviewed for abuse of discretion. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Disposition of this appeal is governed by Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 16(d) and Rule 
37(b)(2)(c) which are attached as addendum to Appellee's Brief. 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A Complaint was initially filed by plaint Bonneville Billing and Collection on or about May 
3, 2006, acting as an assignee on behalf of Pacificorp. In the Complaint, plaintiff alleged that 
defendant, Designscape, LLC negligently damaged an "underground primary when digging at 735 
Park Way, resulting in property damages. Following nearly two years of attempted mediations and 
pretrial conferences, the matter was set for bench trial. The Court sent out notice to the parties and 
the matter came on for trial on April 9, 2008. The day of the trial neither the defendant nor its 
counsel appeared. The Court determined that both the defendant and counsel for the defendant had 
been given proper notice of the trial and grated the plaintiffs oral motion to strike the answer and 
enter default against the defendant. 
The defendant filed a Rule 60(b) Motion to Set Aside Judgment on April 29, 2008. The 
motion was briefed and a Request to Submit the motion was filed December 2008. A hearing on the 
motion was set for January 14,2009. The Court entered an order denying the motion on March 13, 
2009. The defendant filed an appeal of that order on April 24,2009, Case No. 20090395-CA. This 
Court entered a Memorandum Decision dismissing the appeal of the March 16,2009 order denying 
Designscape's rule 60(b) motion because the notice of appeal was not timely and the Court lacked 
jurisdiction to consider the merits. 
The defendant appealed the May, 20, 2008 order on April 24, 2009. This Court entered a 
Memorandum Decision dismissing the appeal. The Court ruled that the May 20,2008 order was not 
a final appealable order and dismissed the appeal without prejudice. The case was remitted to the 
District Court. 
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Defendant then filed a motion styled as a Motion to Arrest Entry of Final Order or Judgment, 
and for Dismissal. In this motion the defendant argue that the cause of action was not assignable and 
therefore the plaintiff had no standing to sue the defendant and the court had no jurisdiction to hear 
the case. This motion was fully briefed and came on for hearing on January 13, 2010. After 
considering the arguments of the parties and reviewing the pleadings, the Court made its ruling and 
order denying the motion. The Court in its Ruling and Order modified its order of May 20,2008 and 
instructed counsel as to the changes to the order. 
Plaintiffs counsel submitted an order as instructed by the Court and said order was entered 
on April 9, 2010. That on April 30, 2010 the defendant filed this appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The appellant failed to appear and defend at trial after receiving notice from the court. The 
appellant has not addressed this in appellant's brief. The appellant alludes to failure to adhere to 
discovery rules. The court reviewed the file and found that notice was properly sent to appellant by 
the court. The trial courts have the authority to dismiss an action as a sanction for a party's failure 
to appear and defend at trial. The court did not abuse its discretion in striking the appellant's answer 
and entering default judgment. 
The appellant argues the ruling on the Motion to Set Aside Judgment. That ruling was 
entered in March 13, 2009 and appealed to this Court on April 24, 2009. This Court entered a 
Memorandum Decision dismissing the appeal of the March 16, 2009 order denying Designscape's 
rule 60(b) motion because the notice of appeal was not timely and the Court lacked jurisdiction to 
consider the merits. The issue can not be argued again in this appeal. 
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The appellant argues that the complaint wholly failed to plead or aver requirements of Utah 
Code Annotated 54-8a and that accordingly the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case at 
all. The appellant's Motion to Dismiss denied by the court's Ruling and Order to that effect was 
entered on March 12,2010. The appellant filed this appeal on April 30,2010. The appellant's appeal 
of that Order is not timely and the Court should dismiss for lack of jurisdiction to consider the 
merits. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DESIGNSCAPE FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE 
The District Court in this case entered a finding in support the Judgment. R.308. The 
finding states that "THE COURT: Okay, then based on the proffer the Court will find that the matter 
was regularly set for trial. Notice was given. Defendant did not appear at the trial. The Court will 
adopt findings as outlined by Mr. Sullivan." R.308. The Court finds that the clerk had sent proper 
notice to the parties, notifying them that the trial was scheduled April 9, 2008. The notice was 
mailed to the Defendant. R308 
On appeal, Designscape does not address the finding was supported by the evidence. In 
order to challenge a factual finding, "[a]n Appellant must marshal the evidence in support of the 
findings and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in 
support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence." In re: Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 
(Utah 1989) (quotations omitted). 
This obligation of the Appellant is critical. The nature of this duty and its import were 
discussed at length by the Supreme Court in Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82,100 P.3d 1177. The court 
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cited the Utah Court of Appeals in its explanation that "in order to properly discharge the duty of 
marshaling the evidence, the challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every 
scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the Appellant 
resists." Id at 1 77 (quoting Neelv v. Bennett, 2002 UT App 189, f 11, 51 P.3d 724 (emphasis 
omitted)). 
An Appellant may not merely re-argue the factual case as it was presented to the trial court. 
I d (citing Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage & Warehouse Inc.. 872 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994)). Nor may a party merely summarize all of the evidence that was submitted at trial. Id. 
Rather, the Appellant must actually play "devil's advocate. Id at f 78 (quoting Harding v. BelL 
2002 UT 108, K 19, 57 P.3d 1093). The Appellant must take the case from the Appellee's 
perspective, construing all facts in favor of the Appellee, and then explain why the trial court's 
findings are against the clear weight of the evidence. Id (citations and quotations omitted). 
Designscape utterly failed to marshal the evidence in support of the judgment. 
Designscape's brief does not address the existence of evidence that Designscape was notified of 
the trial date and failed to appear. The brief lacks any argument as to why the court's sanction was 
not appropriate. 
Appellant cannot shift his burden to marshal by claiming that there is no evidence to support 
the trial court's findings. "This would inappropriately force an Appellee to marshal the evidence in 
order to refute an Appellant's assertion of the absence of evidence." Chen, 2004 UT at f 79 (citing 
Wilson Supply. Inc. v. Fraden Mfg. Corp.. 2002 UT 94, f 22,54 P.3d 1177.) The Appellant's failure 
to marshal the evidence should result in this court assuming that the trial court's findings are correct 
and affirming the lower court's decision. Chen. 2004 UT at f 80 (citations omitted.) 
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II - JUDGE'S ORDER IS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
Designscape's brief does not address the court entering an order striking the Defendant's 
answer and entering default judgment. Even though the dismissal of non complying party's action 
is one of the most severe of potential sanctions that can be imposed. The trial court has discretion 
to impose such sanction. Morton v. Continental Banking Co. 1997, 938 P.2d 271, 314 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 33. 
A trial court's abuse of discretion in selecting which sanction to impose for discovery 
violation may be shown only if there is either an erroneous conclusion at law or no evidentiary basis 
for the trial court's ruling. Tuck v. Godfrey. 1999, 981 P.2d 407, 367 Utah Adv. Rep. 42. 
Because the trial judge deals directly with the parties and the discovery process, he or she has 
great latitude in determining the most efficient and fair manner to conduct the court's business; as 
a result, trial courts have broad discretion in determining whether a violation of a scheduling order 
warrants sanctions. A.K.&R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating v. Aspen Coast 1999, 977 P.2d 518, 
365 Utah Adv. Rep. 3. 
The court's findings that proper notice of the hearing was mailed to the parties was supported 
by the evidence. The record shows that the notice was mailed to Defendant's counsel at the address 
on her pleading and the Court did not abuse its discretion by entering a sanction. 
III. DESIGNSCAPE APPEAL OF RULING ON RULE 60(b) IS NOT TIMELY 
Designscape argues the ruling on the Motion to Set Aside Judgment. That ruling was 
entered in March 13, 2009 and appealed to this Court on April 24, 2009. This Court entered a 
Memorandum Decision dismissing the appeal of the March 16,2009 order denying Designscape's 
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rule 60(b) motion because the notice of appeal was not timely and the Court lacked jurisdiction to 
consider the merits. The issue can not be argued again in this appeal. 
IV DESIGNSCAPE APPEAL OF RULING ON MOTION TO 
DISMISS FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION IS NOT TIMELY 
Designscape argues that the complaint wholly failed to plead or aver requirements of Utah 
Code Annotated 54-8a and that accordingly the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case at 
all. The appellant's Motion to Dismiss was denied by the district court. The court's Ruling and 
Order to that effect was entered on March 12,2010 and is a final appealable order. The Ruling and 
Order " specifies with certainty a final determination of the rights of the parties and is susceptible 
to enforcement." Swenson Associates Architects v. State, 889 P. 2d 415 (Utah 1994) The appellant 
filed this appeal on April 30,2010. The appellant's appeal of that Order is not timely and the Court 
should dismiss for lack of jurisdiction to consider the merits. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial Court's ruling is supported by the record. Designscape cannot establish that the 
Court abused its discretion in imposing sanctions for Defendant's failure to appear at the trial. For 
the foregoing reasons, the District Court's judgment should be AFFIRMED and Plaintiff should be 
awarded attorney's fees and costs on appeal. 
DATED this / day of February, 2011. 
KEVIN P. SULLIVAN, 
Attorney for Appellee 
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Rule 16. Pretrial conferences, scheduling, and management conferences, 
(a) Pretrial conferences. In any action, the court in its discretion or upon motion of a party, may 
direct the attorneys for the parties and any unrepresented parties to appear before it for a 
conference or conferences before trial for such purposes as: 
(a)(1) expediting the disposition of the action; 
(a)(2) establishing early and continuing control so that the case will not be protracted for lack of 
management; 
(a)(3) discouraging wasteful pretrial activities; 
(a)(4) improving the quality of the trial through more thorough preparation; 
(a)(5) facilitating the settlement of the case; and 
(a)(6) considering all matters as may aid in the disposition of the case. 
(b) Scheduling and management conference and orders. In any action, in addition to any other 
pretrial conferences that may be scheduled, the court, upon its own motion or upon the motion of 
a party, may conduct a scheduling and management conference. The attorneys and unrepresented 
parties shall appear at the scheduling and management conference in person or by remote 
electronic means. Regardless whether a scheduling and management conference is held, on 
motion of a party the court shall enter a scheduling order that governs the time: 
(b)(1) to join other parties and to amend the pleadings; 
(b)(2) to file motions; and 
(b)(3) to complete discovery. 
The scheduling order may also include: 
(b)(4) modifications of the times for disclosures under Rules 26(a) and 26(e)(1) and of the extent 
of discovery to be permitted; 
(b)(5) the date or dates for conferences before trial, a final pretrial conference, and trial; and 
(b)(6) provisions for preservation, disclosure or discovery of electronically stored information; 
(b)(7) any agreements the parties reach for asserting claims of privilege or of protection as trial-
preparation material after production; and 
(b)(8) any other matters appropriate in the circumstances of the case. 
Unless the order sets the date of trial, any party may and the plaintiff shall, at the close of all 
discovery, certify to the court that the case is ready for trial. The court shall schedule the trial as 
soon as mutually convenient to the court and parties. The court shall notify parties of the date of 
trial and of any pretrial conference. 
(c) Final pretrial or settlement conferences. In any action where a final pretrial conference has 
been ordered, it shall be held as close to the time of trial as reasonable under the circumstances. 
The conference shall be attended by at least one of the attorneys who will conduct the trial for 
each of the parties, and the attorneys attending the pretrial, unless waived by the court, shall have 
available, either in person or by telephone, the appropriate parties who have authority to make 
binding decisions regarding settlement. 
(d) Sanctions. If a party or a party's attorney fails to obey a scheduling or pretrial order, if no 
appearance is made on behalf of a party at a scheduling or pretrial conference, if a party or a 
party's attorney is substantially unprepared to participate in the conference, or if a party or a 
party's attorney fails to participate in good faith, the court, upon motion or its own initiative, may 
take any action authorized by Rule 37(b)(2). 
Advisory7 Committee Notes 
Rule 37. Failure to make or cooperate in discovery; sanctions. 
(a) Motion for order compelling discovery. A party, upon reasonable notice to other parties and all persons affected thereby, 
may apply for an order compelling discovery as follows: 
(a)(1) Appropriate court. An application for an order to a party may be made to the court in which the action is pending, or, 
on matters relating to a deposition, to the court In the district where the deposition Is being taken. An application for an 
order to a deponent who is not a party shall be made to the court in the district where the deposition is being taken. 
(a)(2) Motion. 
(a)(2)(A) If a party fails to make a disclosure required by Rule 26(a), any other party may move to compel disclosure and 
for appropriate sanctions The motion must include a certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted 
to confer with the party not making the disclosure in an effort to secure the disclosure without court action. 
(a)(2)(B) If a deponent fails to answer a question propounded or submitted under Rule 30 or 31, or a corporation or other 
entity fails to make a designation under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a), or a party fails to answer an interrogatory submitted under 
Rule 33, or if a party, in response to a request for inspection submitted under Rule 34, fails to respond that inspection will 
be permitted as requested or fails to permit inspection as requested, the discovering party may move for an order 
compelling an answer, or a designation, or an order compelling inspection in accordance with the request. The motion must 
include a certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the person or party failing to 
make the discovery in an effort to secure the information or material without court action. When taking a deposition on oral 
examination, the proponent of the question may complete or adjourn the examination before applying for an order. 
(a)(3) Evasive or incomplete disclosure, answer, or response For purposes of this subdivision an evasive or incomplete 
disclosure, answer, or response is to be treated as a failure to disclose, answer, or respond. 
(a)(4) Expenses and sanctions. 
(a)(4)(A) If the motion is granted, or if the disclosure or requested discovery is provided after the motion was filed, the 
court shall, after opportunity for hearing, require the party or deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion or the party 
or attorney advising such conduct or both of them to pay to the moving party the reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining 
the order, including attorney fees, unless the court finds that the motion was filed without the movant's first making a good 
faith effort to obtain the disclosure or discovery without court action, or that the opposing party's nondisclosure, response, 
or objection was substantially justified, or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust 
(a)(4)(B) If the motion is denied, the court may enter any protective order authorized under Rule 26(c) and shall, after 
opportunity for hearing, require the moving party or the attorney or both of them to pay to the party or deponent who 
opposed the motion the reasonable expenses incurred in opposing the motion, including attorney fees, unless the court finds 
that the making of the motion was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. 
(a)(4)(C) If the motion is granted in part and denied in part, the court may enter any protective order authorized under Rule 
26(c) and may, after opportunity for hearing, apportion the reasonable expenses incurred in relation to the motion among 
the parties and persons in a just manner. 
(b) Failure to comply with order. 
(b)(1) Sanctions by court in district where deposition is taken If a deponent fails to be sworn or to answer a question after 
being directed to do so by the court in the district in which the deposition is being taken, the failure may be considered a 
contempt of that court. 
(b)(2) Sanctions by court in which action is pending. If a party fails to obey an order entered under Rule 16(b) or if a party 
or an officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf 
of a party fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery, including an order made under Subdivision (a) of this rule or 
Rule 3 5 , , unless the court finds that the failure was substantially justified, the court in which the action is pending may take 
such action in regard to the failure as are just, including the following-
(b)(2)(A) deem the matter or any other designated facts to be established for the purposes of the action in accordance with 
the claim of the party obtaining the order, 
(b)(2)(B)prohibit the disobedient party from supporting or opposing designated claims or defenses or from introducing 
designated matters in evidence; 
(b)(2)(C) strike pleadings or parts thereof, stay further proceedings until the order is obeyed, dismiss the action or 
proceeding or any part thereof, or render judgment by default against the disobedient party, 
(b)(2)(D) order the party or the attorney to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, caused by the failure; 
(b)(2)(E) treat the failure to obey an order, other than an order to submit to a physical or mental examination, as contempt 
of court; and 
(b)(2)(F) instruct the jury regarding an adverse inference. 
(c) Expenses on failure to admit If a party fails to admit the genuineness of any document or the truth of any matter as 
requested under Rule 36, and if the party requesting the admissions thereafter proves the genuineness of the document or 
the truth of the matter, the party requesting the admissions may apply to the court for an order requiring the other party tc 
pay the reasonable expenses incurred in making that proof, including reasonable attorney fees. The court shall make the 
order unless it finds that (1) the request was held objectionable pursuant to Rule 36(a), or (2) the admission sought was of 
no substantial importance, or (3) the party failing to admit had reasonable ground to believe that he might prevaH on the 
matter, or (4) there was other good reason for the failure to admit. 
(d) Failure of party to attend at own deposition or serve answers to interrogatories or respond to request for inspection. If a 
party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on 
behalf of a party fails (1) to appear before the officer who is to take the deposition, after being served with a proper notice, 
or (2) to serve answers or objections to interrogatories submitted under Rule 33, after proper service of the interrogatories, 
or (3) to serve a written response to a request for inspection submitted under Rule 34, after proper service of the request, 
the court . on motion may take any action authorized by Subdivision (b)(2). 
The failure to act described in this subdivision may not be excused on the ground that the discovery sought is objectionable 
unless the party failing to act has applied for a protective order as provided by Rule 26(c). 
(e) Failure to participate in the framing of a discovery plan. If a party or attorney fails to participate in good faith in the 
framing of a discovery plan by agreement as is required by Rule 26(f)/ the court on motion may take any action authorized 
by Subdivision (b)(2). 
(f) Failure to disclose. If a party fails to disclose a witness, document or other material as required by Rule 26(a) or Rule 26 
(e)(1), or to amend a prior response to discovery as required by Rule 26(e)(2), that party shall not be permitted to use the 
witness, document or other material at any hearing unless the failure to disclose is harmless or the party shows good cause 
for the failure to disclose. In addition to or in lieu of this sanction, the court on motion may take any action authorized by 
Subdivision (b)(2). 
(g) Failure to preserve evidence. Nothing in this rule limits the inherent power of the court to take any action authorized by 
Subdivision (b)(2) if a party destroys, conceals, alters, tampers with or fails to preserve a document, tangible item, 
electronic data or other evidence in violation of a duty. Absent exceptional circumstances, a court may not impose sanctions 
under these rules on a party for failing to provide electronically stored information lost as a result of the routine, good-faith 
operation of an electronic information system. 
